On the security of the hierarchical attribute based encryption scheme
  proposed by Wang et al by Ali, Mohammad et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
05
86
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
3 O
ct 
20
18
On the security of the hierarchical attribute based encryption scheme
proposed by Wang et al.
Mohammad Ali, Javad Mohajeri, Mohammad-Reza Sadeghi
a Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.
bElectronic Research Institute, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Ciphertext-policy hierarchical attribute-based encryption (CP-HABE) is a promising cryptographic primi-
tive for enforcing the fine-grained access control with scalable key delegation and user revocation mecha-
nisms on the outsourced encrypted data in a cloud. Wang et al. (2011) proposed the first CP-HABE scheme
and showed that the scheme is semantically secure in the random oracle model [4, 5]. Due to some weak-
ness in its key delegation mechanism, by presenting two attacks, we demonstrate the scheme does not
offer any confidentiality and fine-grained access control. In this way, anyone who has just one attribute can
recover any outsourced encrypted data in the cloud.
Keywords: Cloud computing, Hierarchical attribute-based encryption, Fine-grained access
control
1. Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme [1] is a one-to-many cryptographic primitive which provides
confidentiality and fine-grained access control over the outsourced encrypted data, simultaneously. It pro-
vides access control on the shared data by specifying an access structure over the ciphertexts or data users’
secret-keys. According to the position of the access structure, this cryptographic primitive can be divided
into two categories; key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) [2] and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [3]. In a KP-ABE
the access structure is embedded in data users’ secret-keys by the key-generator authority and each cipher-
text is labeled by a set of descriptive attributes. A data user can decrypt the ciphertext if and only if the
user’s access structure is satisfied by the ciphertext’s attributes. While, in a CP-ABE the access structure is
embedded in the ciphertext by the data owner, and considering attributes of each data user, his/her secret-
keys are issued by the key-generator authority. A data users can recover an encrypted data if and only if
his/her attributes satisfy the access structure of the ciphertext.
In an ABE scheme data users have to make queries to the key generator authority for their secret-keys.
However, this can make some problems in the scalability and flexibility of the system when a large number
of data users want to get their secret-keys, simultaneously.
In order to address the scalability problem, Wang et al. proposed a CP-hierarchical ABE (CP-HABE)
scheme [5], by combining a hierarchical identity based encryption (HIBE) scheme [6] and a CP-ABE [3]
scheme. By partitioning the universal attribute set to some disjoint subsets, they considered several key
generators that each of them administers one of the subsets. In this scheme for each attribute, the data user
just can get the corresponding secret-key from the key generator that manage a subset which contains the
mentioned attribute.
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After that, this idea had been used in several ABE schemes. Wan et al. proposed a Hierarchal attribute
set-based encryption (HASBE) [7], by combining the notion of HABE and the CP-ASBE scheme proposed
by Bobba et al. [8]. Li et al. [9] proposed a multi-authority access control system with efficient key del-
egation and user revocation mechanisms. Using outsourcing technique, they significantly decrease the
computational cost in the user side. Liu et al. [10] proposed a time-based proxy re-encryption scheme,
by combining an HABE scheme and a proxy re-encryption scheme [11, 12], with a wide flexibility in user
revocation mechanism. In this scheme, data owner can be off-line along the user revocation phase. Huang
et al. [13] proposed a data collaboration scheme, by using HABE model in the key delegation mechanism.
As [9], data outsourcing has been used to reduce the data user’s computational cost.
Although, it has been proved that the CP-HABE scheme proposed by Wang et al. [5] is semantically
secure in the random oracle model, we showed that this scheme is fully insecure according to the given
security definition in [5]. The scheme has some obvious drawbacks in its key delegation mechanism which
enables a malicious user to decrypt all the shared encrypted data in the cloud with just one attribute.
The rest of this letter is organized as follows: Some necessary basic concepts will be reviewed in Section
2. We introduce CP-HABE scheme proposed by Wang et al. [5] and its security definition in Section 3.
In Section 4 we give two attacks on the scheme that both of them break the security of the scheme with
probability 1. The conclusion of the paper is presented in Section 5.
2. preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some required definitions and hardness assumptions.
2.1. Bilinear map
Consider two cyclic groups G1 and G2 of a prime order p. Suppose that P0 is a generator of G1. A
function eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 is a bilinear map if it has the following properties:
1. Non-degeneracy: eˆ(P0, P0) 6= 1.
2. Bilinearity: eˆ(aP1, bP2) = eˆ(bP1, aP2) = eˆ(P1, P2)
ab, for any a, b ∈ Zp and P1, P2 ∈ G1 .
3. Computability: there is a polynomial time algorithm which compute eˆ(P1, P2), for any P1, P2 ∈ G1.
Consider two cyclic groups G1, G2 of prime order p, a bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2, and a random
generator P0 ∈ G1. The Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) problem is to compute eˆ(P0, P0)
abc for three given
elements aP0, bP0, cP0 ∈ G1, where a, b, and c are three uniform elements of Zp.
2.2. Access structure
Consider a universal attribute set U = {a1, . . . , an}. Each nonempty subset A of 2
U is called an access
structure on U. For an access structure A, any set in A is called an authorized set of attributes and the
other ones are called unauthorized sets.
Any access structure A can be specified by a logical proposition
N
∨
i=1
CCi, where each CCi, i = 1, . . . , n, is
a conjunction clause of some attributes. For example, the access structureA = {{a1, a2} , {a1, a3} , {a2, a3, a4}}
corresponds to the logical proposition
3
∨
i=1
CCi = (a1 ∧ a2) ∨ (a1 ∧ a3) ∨ (a2 ∧ a3 ∧ a4). For simplicity,
A =
N
∨
i=1
CCi is used for indicating an access structure. This type of presentation is called disjunctive
normal form (DNF).
3. CP-HABE proposed by Wang et al. [5].
In this section, we first introduce system model of the Wang’s scheme, then the applied algorithms of
this system are introduced in detail. After that, semantic security definition for a CP-HABE scheme which
is proposed by Wang et al. [5] will be presented.
2
3.1. Model definition and constructions
In the CP-HABE scheme proposed by Wang et al. [6] the disjunctive normal form (DNF) is used for
expressing the access control policy and a hierarchical key generation and user revocation model is applied
to provide scalable and flexible mechanisms. Moreover, in this scheme each domain authority manages a
number of disjoint attributes.
This system consists of five entities: the root master (RM), the cloud service provider (CSP), data own-
ers, the domain authorities, and data users. The RM is responsible for generating the global public param-
eters and master keys for domain authorities at the first level. The cloud service provider’s role is to let a
data owner to store its data and share them with some data users. The role of data owner is determining
an access structure for his/her own data, encrypting the data under it, and outsourcing the encrypted data
in the cloud. The domain authorities generate attribute secret-keys for some of the entities (data users or
domain authorities) which stay on the next level. Data users can decrypt the outsourced encrypted data
using their attribute secret-keys.
In this scheme, the applied key generation algorithms, named CeateDM and CreateUser adopt a hier-
archical approach. First, the RM generates global public parameters of the system by the Setup algorithm
and then generates the master secret-key of the domain authority in the first level, using the CeateDM al-
gorithm. After that, some domain authorities run the CeateDM algorithm and generate master secret-keys
of the domain authorities in its children. Also, the domain authorities in the last level generate identity
secret-keys and attribute secret-keys of the authorized data users, using the CreateUser algorithm. When
a data owner wants to outsource some data to the cloud, he/she should define an access structure and
encrypt his/her data under the access structure using the Encrypt algorithm. Each data user can access to
an outsourced encrypted data by running the Decrypt algorithm if and only if his/her attributes satisfy
the access structure corresponding to the encrypted data.
In this scheme, it is assumed that each domain authority DMi, data user u, and attribute a in the uni-
versal attribute set has a unique public-key PKi, PKu and PKa, respectively. The scheme can be described
by the following five algorithms:
1. Setup: This algorithm is run by the RM. It takes the security parameter n as input and picks a large
prime number q, two cyclic groups G1 and G2 of order q, a bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2, a uniform
element mk0 ∈ Zq, three random oracle H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1, H2 : G2 → {0, 1}
n and HA : {0, 1}
∗ → Zq,
and a random generator P0 ∈ G1. The algorithm outputs the master secret-key MK0 = mk0 and
system public parameters params = (q,G1,G2, e, P0,Q0,H1,H2,HA), where Q0 = mk0P0.
2. CreateDM: This algorithm is run by the root master or a domain authority as the parent. The inputs
of the algorithm are the system public parameters params, master secret-key MKi of the parent and
the public-key of the domain authority DMi+1, PKi+1. The output of the algorithm is the DMi+1’s
master secret-key MKi+1 =
(
mki+1,Hmki+1, SKi+1,Q− tuplei+1
)
, where mki+1 ∈ Zq is the index of
the random oracle Hmki+1 : {0, 1}
∗ → Zq, Pi+1 = H1(PKi+1), SKi+1 = SKi +mkiPi+1, Q− tuple0 =
(Q0), and Q− tuplei+1 = (Q− tupei,Qi+1 = mki+1P0), for i ≥ 0.
3. CreateUser: When a data user u makes a query to the domain authority DMi for a secret-key corre-
sponding to an attribute a, DMi checks whether the user is authorized for a or not. If so, it runs this
algorithm to generate the identity secret-key SKi,u = (Q− tupei−1,mkimkuP0) and attribute secret-
key SKi,a,u = SKi +mkimkuPa, where mku = HA(PKu) and Pa = Hmki(PKa)P0.
4. Encrypt: This algorithm is run by a data owner. It takes public parameter params, a message M, an
access structure A =
N
∨
i=1
CCi =
N
∨
i=1
ni
∧
j=1
aij, and a set of the corresponding public-key of the attributes,
{
PKaij : 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
}
. Suppose that all of the attributes in CCi are covered by a specified do-
main authority DMiti
. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ N, consider the unique path (ID1, . . . , IDiti) for DM1 to the
domainDMiti . The algorithm outputs a ciphertextCT = (A,V,U0,U12, . . . ,U1t1,U1, . . . ,UN2, . . . ,UNtN ,
3
UN), where V = M⊕ H2(eˆ(Q0, rnAP1)) and nA is the lowest common multiple (LCM) of n1, . . . , nN ,
r ∈ Zq is a uniform element, U0 = rP0, Ui = r
ni
∑
j=1
Paij, and Uik = rPik, for i = 1, . . . ,N and
k = 1, . . . , ti.
5. Decrypt: A data user whose attributes satisfy the access structure A =
N
∨
i=1
CCi =
N
∨
i=1
ni
∧
j=1
aij of a
ciphertext CT, can run this algorithm and recover the corresponding message. Suppose that for an
i ∈ {1, . . . , ni}, a data user has all the determined attributes in CCi, then the corresponding message
can be obtained as follows:
V ⊕ H2(
eˆ(U0,
nA
ni
ni
∑
j=1
SKiti ,u,aij
)
eˆ(mkumkitiP0,
nA
ni
Ui) ∏
ti
j=2 eˆ(Uij, nAQi(j−1))
).
We refer the reader to [5] for more detail about this scheme.
3.2. Security definition:
Consider the following game:
1. Setup: The challenger runs Setup algorithm and gives the system public parameters to the adversary.
2. Phase 1: First of all, challenger runs CreateDM algorithm, then the adversary A makes an arbitrary
number of queries for users’ attribute secret-keys. For each data user u, once the adversary makes
a query for the user’s secret-key corresponding to an attribute a, the challenger runs CreateUser
algorithm, and gives the requested secret-key to the adversaryA.
3. Challenge: When the adversary decides to terminate Phase 1, he/she gives two equal length mes-
sages m0, m1 and an access structure A to the challenger, where the set of specified attributes for
any data users in Phase 1, dose not satisfied the access structure A. Then, the challenger randomly
chooses b ∈ {0, 1}, encrypts mb under the access structure, and returns the encrypted message to the
adversaryA.
4. Phase 2: The adversary is allowed tomakemore attribute secret-keys query, with the same constraints
in the previous phases.
5. Guess: The adversary outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. It wins this game if b = b′.
Let notation Succeed(A) denotes the event that the adversary A succeeds in the above game. A CP-HABE
scheme is semantically secure if
∣∣∣P(Succeed(A)− 12 )
∣∣∣ is a negligible function in term of the security param-
eter, for each polynomial time adversaryA.
In Appendix A of [5], the semantic security of the CP-HABE scheme has been proved based on the
hardness assumption of BDH problem, in the random oracle model . In the next section we will show that
this scheme is vulnerable against our two proposed attacks.
4. Security analysis of the CP-HABE scheme proposed by Wang et al.
We show that there are two drawbacks in the key delegation mechanism of the CP-HABE proposed by
Wang et al. [4, 5]. Considering these drawbacks, a malicious data user with just one or two attributes can
decrypt any outsourced encrypted data in the cloud.
In the following, we propose two non-adaptive attacks on the CP-HABE scheme. Each of them breaks
the semantic security of the scheme with probability 1.
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Remark. For an arbitrary domain DMiti, let (ID1, . . . , IDiti) be the unique path from DM1 to DMiti. Then, we
have:
SKiti = SKi(ti−1) +mki(ti−1)Piti
= SK1 +
ti−1
∑
j=1
mkijPi(j+1). (1)
Theorem 1. For an arbitrary domain DMiti with (ID1, . . . , IDiti), any user u who has received his/her identity
secret-key SKiti,u and obtained the secret-key of DMiti , SKiti , can recover any outsourced encrypted data to the could.
Proof. Sine the user has received SKiti,u =
(
Q− tupleiti−1,mkitimkuP0
)
=
(
Q0, . . . ,Qi(ti−1),mkuQiti
)
and
can obtain mku = HA(PKu), he/she can calculate Qiti by multiplying mk
−1
u = (HA(PKu))
−1 ∈ Zq to the
last component of SKiti,u,mkuQiti . So, the user knowQij for each 1 ≤ j ≤ ti. Let CT = (A,V,U0,U12, . . . ,U1t1,
U1, . . . ,UN2, . . . ,UNtN ,UN) be an arbitrary outsourced encrypted data. Then, sinceV = M⊕H2(eˆ(Q0, nArP1))
we have:
M = V ⊕ H2(eˆ(Q0, nArP1))
= V ⊕ H2(eˆ(mk0P0, nArP1))
= V ⊕ H2(eˆ(nArP0,mk0P1))
= V ⊕ H2(eˆ(nAU0, SK1))
= V ⊕ H2(eˆ(nAU0, SK1 +
ti−1
∑
j=1
mkijPi(j+1)−
ti−1
∑
j=1
mkijPi(j+1))) (2)
From Equation 1, we conclude that:
M = V ⊕ H2(eˆ(nAU0, SKiti −
ti−1
∑
j=1
mkijPi(j+1)))
= V ⊕ H2(eˆ(nAU0, SKiti).eˆ(−nAU0,
ti−1
∑
j=1
mkijPi(j+1)))
= V ⊕ H2(eˆ(nAU0, SKiti).
ti−1
∏
j=1
eˆ(−nArP0,mkijPi(j+1)))
= V ⊕ H2(eˆ(nAU0, SKiti).
ti−1
∏
j=1
eˆ(−nAmkijP0, rPi(j+1)))
= V ⊕ H2(eˆ(nAU0, SKiti).
ti−1
∏
j=1
eˆ(−nAQij,Ui(j+1))), (3)
According to the assumption that the data user u has obtained SKiti , since he/she know Qij, for j = 1, . . . , ti,
and the other involved parameter in (3), the ciphertext can be decrypted by the user.
4.1. Attack 1
This attack shows that any user who has just one attribute administrated by a domain DMiti can obtain
SKiti . Therefore, from Theorem 1, we get the user can recover any outsourced encrypted data to the cloud.
According to the Security definition presented in the last section. Let a challenger has run the Setup and
CreateDM algorithms andA be a polynomial time adversary which is taken the system public parameters
params generated by Setup algorithm.
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• Then A picks just an arbitrary attribute a0 and authorized data user u0 to the attribute and makes a
query for the corresponding secret-key. The challenger runs the CreateUser algorithm and gives the
requested secret-keys, SKiti,u0 and SKiti,a0,u0 = SKiti +mkitimku0Pa0 , to the adversary A.
• At Challenge step, A gives two random equal length plaintexts m0 and m1, and a DNF access struc-
ture A =
N
∨
i=1
CCi to the challenger, where CC1 includes a0 and also |CC1| > 1, therefore a0 does not
satisfy CC1. The challenger chooses a uniform bit b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts mb under an access strutter
A =
N
∨
i=1
CCi. The generated ciphertext CT is given to A.
• With no need to run Phase 2, in Guess step, first, A calculates Hmkiti
(PKa), then using the last compo-
nent of SKiti,u0 ,mkitimku0P0, it calculates Aa0,u0 = Hmkiti
(PKa0).mkitimkuP0 = mkitimku0Pa0 . Therefore,
A can obtain SKiti = SKiti,a0,u0 − Aa0,u0 .
Now, from Theorem 1, since the adversary has SKu0,i and SKi, he/she can decrypt CT and get m0. So
the adversary can win the game with probability 1
Theorem 2. By using the described techniques in Attack 1, a polynomial time adversary A in a non-adaptive
manner can break the semantic security of the CP-HABE scheme proposed by Wang et al. [5] with probability
1.
Note that using Attack 1, an adversary with just one attribute secret-key, can decrypt any given ciphertext.
4.2. Attack 2
The attack shows that any user who has two attributes administrated by same domain can obtainmaster
secret key of the domain and therefore from Theorem 1 he/she can decrypt any outsourced ciphertext to
the cloud.
As before, considering the security definition presented in Section 3, Let the Setup and CreateDM
algorithms have been run by a challenger and system pubic-parameters are given to the adversaryA′.
• The adversary picks two attributes a1 and a2, and a data user u0. Then it makes two queries for
the corresponding secret-keys. The challenger runs CreateUser algorithm and gives the secret-keys
SKi,u0 = (Q− tupei−1,mkimku0P0) , SKi,a1,u0 = SKi +mkimku0Pa1 and SKi,a2,u0 = SKi +mkimku0Pa2 to
the adversary.
• In Challenge step, the adversary A′ gives two equal length messages m0 and m1, and an access
structure A =
N
∨
i=1
CCi to the challenger, where |CC1| > 2. The challenger uniformly chooses b ∈
{0, 1} and sends the generated ciphertext CT corresponding to mb and A to the adversary.
• Without runing Phase 2, inGuess step, the adversary sets:
Ba,u0 = (SKi,a1,u0 − SKi,a2,u0)
= mkimku0(Pa1 − Pa2)
= (Hmki(PKa1)− Hmki(PKa2))(mkimku0P0).
So, Ci,a1,u0 = Hmki(PKa1)(Hmki(PKa1)− Hmki(PKa2))
−1Ba,u0 = Hmki(PKa1)mku0mkiP0 = mku0mkiPa1
can be obtained by the adversary. Now, ifA′ sets SKi = SKi,a1,u0 − Ci,a1,u0 , for Lemma 1 it can decrypt
any outsourced ciphertext. Therefore the adversary can win the game with probability 1.
Theorem 3. Attack 2 enables a non-adaptive adversary to break the semantic security of the CP-HABE pro-
posed by Wang et al. with probability 1.
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5. Conclusion
In this manuscript, we showed that the CP-HABE proposed by Wang et al. [5] is fully insecure. We
provided two attacks which break the scheme’s security with probability 1, that is contrary to the authors’
claim. Moreover, it was shown that any malicious user who has just one attribute can recover any out-
sourced encrypted data in the cloud.
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